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Patrick Wilson (1983) developed the cognitive authority theory from social epistemology in his book, ''Second-hand Knowledge: An Inquiry into Cognitive Authority''. The fundamental concept of Wilson’s cognitive authority is that people construct knowledge in two different ways: based on their first-hand experience or on what they have learned second-hand from others. What people learn first-hand depends on the stock of ideas they bring to the interpretation and understanding of their encounters with the world. People primarily depend on others for ideas as well as for information outside the range of direct experience. Much of what they think of the world is what they have gained second-hand. Wilson (1983) argues that all that people know of the world beyond the narrow range of their own lives is what others have told them. However, people do not count all hearsay as equally reliable; only those who are deemed to “know what they are talking about” become cognitive authorities. Wilson coined the term cognitive authority to explain the kind of authority that influences thoughts that people would consciously recognize being proper. Cognitive authority differs from administrative authority or the authority vented in a hierarchical position." (Rieh, 2005). ==Philosophical issues== Wilson's dichotomy between first hand knowledge and second hand knowledge may be a trace left from empiricism. According to non-empiricist epistemologies such as hermeneutics and pragmatism even our first hand knowledge (our perception) is influenced by our culture and hence - mostly indirectly and unconsciously - by cognitive authorities: the way we learn to look at things when brought up in a culture and socialized into a subculture and a domain. The concept of cognitive authority is important because it forces us to be skeptical towards claims in the literature and elsewhere. It forces us to consider the criteria we should use when evaluating information sources. In other words: It forces us to consider epistemological issues. Different "movements", "paradigms", "positions" or "schools" in a given field tend to have different cognitive authorities. "Most people, even most academics, do not have the time, training, or occasion to work through the technical literature on a controversial topic, and so, they must rely on professionals for a disinterested evaluation" (Herrnstein, 1973, pp. 52,53; quoted from Tucker, 1994). Tucker shows, however, that the recognized experts within the field of intelligence research blindly accepted Cyril Burt's research even though it was without scientific value and probably directly faked: They wanted to believe that IQ was hereditary, and considered uncritically empirical claims supporting this view. When a researcher from another field (Leon Kamin) first demonstrated that Burt's results were wrong, he was not considered a cognitive authority. When his criticism was considered unavoidable, the established researchers tried to change history and deprive Kamin of his intellectual credit. This example shows something about how cognitive authority may be ascribed in the real world. The concept of cognitive authority also raises the question of the role of experts. On the one hand, it is dangerous to blindly believe claims originating from "experts" while on the other hand, "commonsensism" is also a problematic epistemology. John Dewey (1920) discussed this dilemma and worked on improving general education in order to make the general public less vulnerable to the power of experts. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)』 ■ウィキペディアで「Cognitive authority」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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